Rallies around the Flag-Draped Coffins [PDF]
Political violence increasingly targets security forces. I examine a natural experiment in Turkey to understand the effect of casualties in these attacks on vote choice. Between two general elections in 2015, Turkey experienced a series of attacks that killed 158 members of the security forces. Based on an exogenous variation of their hometowns across the country, I estimate that the government vote share increases in the burial places of terror victims. However, in the towns with recurring casualties, the support decreases by a slightly higher percentage, cancelling the immediate rally behind the government out. Opposition parties do not experience a significant change in their vote share. Distinguishing between the initial and repeated casualties in an experimental design, these results provide a strong evidence for the rally theory.
Behaviour to Save Energy Differs with Income [PDF]
(with Wouter Poortinga, Pekka Jokinen, and Pasi Pohjolainen)
Reducing consumers’ demand for energy is on the agenda of various energy and climate policies. Although these policies are increasingly centralised in Europe, our understanding of consumers’ energy-saving behaviour remains fragmented with often contradicting findings from single-case studies. Drawing on the latest round of the European Social Survey across 17 countries (n = 32,280), we find that many factors have the same relationship with different energy-saving behaviours, except household income. While income correlates positively with the likelihood of buying energy-efficient appliances, it correlates negatively with the frequency of engaging in energy curtailments. If income has a differentiating effect on consumers’ energy-saving behaviour, then the demand reduction policies that take this difference into account will be more successful.
Saboteurs in the House [PDF]
(with Katrin Auel)
Little is known about how legislators deal with voting against the will of the principals that they represent in parliament. This article analyses legislative debates to understand the effect of divergent preferences on speeches and sentiments on the plenary floor, where legislators express themselves. We argue that this effect depends on the principal sabotaged, varying with the level of their control over legislators’ career advancement and re-election prospects. Analysing the debates in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the House of Commons, we demonstrate that legislators who vote against their constituency or country are rather communicative, and their speeches reveal higher levels of negativity. On the contrary, those defying their party refrain from speaking in parliament, but if they speak, they use a significantly less negative language. These findings suggest that electoral incentives affect whether and how legislators justify their positions when in conflict with their various principals.